On 27 March, about sixteen Northern men were burned alive by an angry mob of residents in Uromi, Edo State. They were accused of being part of the kidnapping and murdering “herdsmen” that had been terrorising the communities around Uromi. According to reports, the victims were travelling through the city in a group of about twenty-five men in a truck from Port Harcourt to Kano to celebrate the Eid al-Fitr with their families. They were stopped by members of the local vigilante group in the town for a traffic check and search. Things escalated after the vigilantes discovered Dane guns in the truck.
An argument broke out as the travellers insisted they were hunters with licensed firearms, while the vigilantes responded with anger and suspicion. A crowd quickly gathered, and before long, the vigilantes began shouting “kidnappers,” inciting the mob. The situation spiralled out of control and the travellers were attacked. A few managed to escape, but most were beaten severely, doused in fuel, and set ablaze. The police arrived too late. Three men were taken to the hospital for treatment, but sixteen had already died.
This barbaric act has drawn condemnation from civil society organisations and key figures in the state apparatus, including the presidency, governors, police chiefs, and other security agencies, who have promised to identify and prosecute the perpetrators. Online, however, the situation has been more contentious. While not representative of the entire population, responses (as with many issues in Nigeria) have taken on ethnic and religious tones.
Northern netizens overwhelmingly condemned the incident, decrying the hatred and ignorance behind it. A small fraction, however, called for reprisals against the Uromi community and Southerners more broadly. Among Southern netizens, there have also been condemnations, but the dominant sentiment has been criticism of what they perceive as the state’s double standards by responding swiftly in this case while showing less urgency in addressing the killings of Southern and Middle Belt residents by“herdsmen.”Some extremist voices even justified the killings, blinded by Islamophobia and hate, and called for Northern or Fulani residents to evacuate the South.
Farmer-herder clashes are, sadly, not a recent phenomenon in Nigeria. Neither are inter-religious or inter-ethnic clashes. These conflicts have existed since independence, and the ruling class has failed to develop a national project capable of uniting the people. As a result, ethnic and religious tensions remain high.
What is more recent, however, is the rise of unprovoked armed attacks on civilians and the state apparatus by organised subversive militias like Boko Haram and its offshoots. Mob justice and public lynchings are also common, often motivated by superstition (accusations of witchcraft or sorcery), petty theft, religious blasphemy, or more serious crimes. These events reflect both the government’s failure to foster social development and the widespread lack of trust in the state’s justice and security systems, especially among working-class people . It’s crucial to note that the typical victims and perpetrators of mob violence are drawn from these same classes—the most exploited and alienated by the system.
On the subject of organised militias such as Boko Haram, much has been written about the group’s ideological roots in the spread of Wahhabist and Salafist doctrines during the 1970s and 80s, as well as its famous financiers. Equally important, however, are the material conditions that enable these groups to exist and endure. As Usman Solomon notes in Academic Journals, endemic poverty in Northern Nigeria and a widespread disillusionment with entrenched authority contribute significantly to the recruitment capabilities of these subversive groups. The Nigerian state has failed to provide development, jobs, and a dignified existence. Boko Haram initially gained mass appeal by distributing alms to the poor and criticising established religious authorities for their silence on poverty.
The cultural dimension
The spread of Wahhabism and the shift from traditional Islamic practices in the North cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of powers like Saudi Arabia in financing these interpretations of Islam, which later developed jihadist dimensions. Similarly, the influence of Western televangelists was critical in spurring the spread of pentecostalist Christian religiosity.
The ruling class in Nigeria has historically wielded only limited sovereignty with the neocolonial state it uses to rule over us, the classes of poor people. The ruling class lacks both the capacity and the will to construct a coherent national project. Although united in the exploitation of the lower classes, they remain divided, competing for access to state power and wealth. To maintain their positions, they often exploit ethnic and religious tensions, even propping up and co-opting radical movements with subversive potential (as with Boko Haram).
They mobilise on religious and ethnic basis, often with the support of Moslem and Christian religious leaders as well as traditional rulers, especially during elections. Similarly, politicians in government ensure these cultural figures receive generous material support. However, these religious and traditional icons do not simply support the sections of the ruling class that they serve. They equally mobilise their own base by presenting people of other faiths or ethnicities as being inferior in one way or the other. These contribute to creating a situation of seeing the other as being less than human.
The broader picture
In the aftermath of recent killings and kidnappings in the Middle Belt and Southern regions which triggered the tragedy in Uromi, there has been a suspicious tendency by the media and government to reduce these issues to mere “clashes” between farmers and herders or “banditry.” While this is partly true, it is also an incomplete narrative. There are deeper socioeconomic and political dimensions at play.
Environmental degradation and the shrinking of Lake Chad because of climate change have forced nomadic and grazing communities in the North to further migrate southward. This increased competition for land and resources has contributed to violent clashes. Climate change is no longer a distant concern—it is an urgent reality.
Another layer is the proliferation of arms following the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. Looted weapons created a thriving arms-smuggling network, and although Boko Haram’s influence has waned due to military operations against it and internal divisions within its ranks, its different splinter groups still remain a threat to the Nigerian state. Only recently, Governor Babagana Zulum raised the alarm that Boko Haram controls three out of the 27 local government areas in the state . With the weapons that Boko Haram and related insurgents as well as bandits of different shades have acquired, many have turned to kidnapping as a lucrative enterprise, and some may even be supported by wealthy elites looking to“cash out.”
Young herders, armed to protect their cattle from rustlers, may find kidnapping and robbery more profitable than the exhausting and poorly paid work of grazing. Of course, there are also militant groups still loyal to their original Salafi-jihadist mission, for whom terrorism is both a means and an end.
At the heart of all this is the state’s failure and the incapacity of the ruling class to guarantee security and safety of the country’s citizens. The government has failed to alleviate poverty, provide employment, or dismantle the institutional roots of extremist religious ideologies. It has failed to prosecute elite collaborators and financiers of terrorism, many of whom now wield considerable power. Even military operations against terror groups are often undermined by corruption, complicity, or infiltration. Worse still are the frequent civilian killings by the military during these operations, routinely dismissed as“mistakes.”
Amid these failures, the current administration has deepened neoliberal reforms, worsening living conditions and plunging the masses further into poverty. The neoliberal measures first introduced under Obasanjo in the late 1970s contributed to the rise of religious fundamentalism by intensifying economic hardship and increasing the political significance of religion. Prior to this, ethnicity was the primary dividing line. Poverty creates fertile ground for reactionary ideologies and divisive politics. The government has failed to address this. The government has failed unabashedly, it has openly abdicated responsibility.
Conclusion
The path forward lies in working-class solidarity and revolutionary collective action. Only through our collective struggle can we address the root causes of Nigeria’s crises, overthrow the capitalist system that they are rooted in, and build a better, socialist society. We must reject sectarian narratives that serve only to divide and distract working-class people from their shared struggle. Workers of all ethnicities and faiths must recognise that capitalists’ interests, both local and foreign, are at the core of the insecurity, poverty, and extremism plaguing our country. We must stand united to resist exploitation, imperialism, and the effects of the climate crisis. Now more than ever, it is essential for the working people of all nations to unite and fight.
by Emmanuel EDOMWONYI
